Indiana Law Journal
Volume 60

Issue 3

Article 3

Summer 1985

The End of Preference Liability for Unsecured Creditors: New
Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code
Darrell Dunham
Southern Illinois School of Law

Donald Price
Temple University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Dunham, Darrell and Price, Donald (1985) "The End of Preference Liability for Unsecured Creditors: New
Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 60 : Iss. 3 , Article 3.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol60/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

The End of Preference Liability for Unsecured

Creditors: New Section 547(c)(2)
of the Bankruptcy Code
DARRELL DuNHAM* AND DONALD PRICE**

INTRODUCTION

Assume that Debtor signed an unsecured note on January 1 obligating
himself to pay Creditor $10,000.00 per month for the next twelve months.
Assume also that Debtor made each payment from February through December but then succumbed to financial pressures and filed for bankruptcy
on December 31. In these circumstances, prior to July 10, 1984, the trustee-inbankruptcy had an excellent chance of recovering the $10,000.00 payments
made on December 1, November 1 and October 1 since all of the elements
of a preference appear to have been met.' The elements of a preference
under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code can be summarized as follows:
1. A transfer;
2.
3.

2

of the estate; 3
Of "an interest of the debtor in property"
' 4
"IT]o or for the benefit of a creditor;

* B.A., 1968, J.D., 1971, Willamette University; L.L.M., 1972, Harvard University;
Professor of Law, Southern Illinois School of Law.
** B.A., Elizabethtown College, 1958; J.D., Temple University School of Law, 1966;
Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law.
The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of research assistants Mr. Martin Hoke,
J.D., 1985, Southern Illinois University School of Law, Susan L. Goldy, J.D., 1985, Temple
University School of Law.
1. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (West 1979 & Supp. 1984).
2. Id. The Bankruptcy Code defines "transfer" as including "every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or
with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure
of the debtor's equity of redemption . . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 101(48) (1982). One court recently
noted that the Code's definition is extremely broad. " 'Transfer' is defined ... as including
every method of disposing of or parting with an interest in property." In re Tonyan Constr.
Co., 28 Bankr. 714, 728 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (emphasis added).
3. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (West 1979 & Supp. 1984). Prior to the 1984 amendment, § 547(b)
was concerned only with a transfer "of property of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982).
Although the legislative history does not reveal the reason for including the language "an
interest of the debtor in property," Congress may have feared that courts would not look to
§ 541's broad definition of property in construing § 547 as well as other sections. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(1) (1982) (defining property as "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property"
(emphasis added)).
4. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(1) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). Under this requirement, recovery
of a fraudulent conveyance to a relative for lack of fair consideration may be available under
§ 548(2), 11 U.S.C. § 548(2)(a) (1982), but would not qualify as a preference. The conveyance
would not be "to or for the benefit of a creditor." 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(1) (West 1979 &
Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
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On account of an antecedent indebtedness; 5

5. While debtor was insolvent;'
6.
7.

"Within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;"
With the effect of providing the creditor with a greater share of the
bankruptcy estate than the creditor would have recovered in a liquidation case if the transfer had not been made.'

The above facts do not reveal whether Debtor was insolvent at the time
of payment. The trustee, however, is greatly aided under the Bankruptcy
Code since Debtor is presumptively insolvent during the 90-day period prior
to bankruptcy filing. 9 Moreover, unless the creditor can establish some sort
of priority, 0 it seems obvious that the creditor is better off, having received
the payment, than if the payment had not been made. Thus, there is a
preferential effect."

5. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(2) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). See, e.g., Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S.
438, 443 (1917) (a preference implies paying or securing a pre-existing debt owed to the person
preferred). See also National City Bank v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). In Hotchkiss, the
debtor borrowed money at 10:00 A.M. to pay cash for stocks which he intended to pledge, in
the ordinary course of business, elsewhere for cash later that same day. The original lender
was to be repaid that afternoon with the funds secured by pledging the newly acquired stock.
An immediate decline in the market value of the shares ruined the debtor by midday. The
debtor advised the original lender that it intended to file a petition in bankruptcy by the end
of the day. The lender, in turn, procured stock certificates from the debtor as security for its
loan. The certificates were not earmarked or segregated as security for a period of about four
hours. The Court noted that "[t]ime sometimes can be disregarded when it is insignificant.
But in this case half the time between the loan and the transfer ... sufficed to change the
position of the borrowers from a fortune ...

to a deficit ...

."

The Court found the transfer

to be preferential. Id. at 58.
6. I1 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(3) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). The Code defines "insolvent" as
a "financial condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such
entity's property, at a fair valuation, exclusive of (i) property transferred, concealed or removed
with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud ... creditors," and exclusive of the entity's exempt
property. 11 U.S.C. § 101(29) (1984). The Bankruptcy Code provides a presumption of debtor's
insolvency "on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the
petition." 11 U.S.C. § 547(0 (1982). The presumption created by § 547(0 shifts the burden
of going forward with evidence of solvency to the adverse party. The burden of proof of the
debtor's insolvency remains with the party in whose favor the presumption operates. H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1977). See, e.g., Clay v. Traders Bank, 708 F.2d 1347 (8th
Cir. 1983).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). The 90-day limit imposed by the
Code represents a change from § 60a(l) of the Bankruptcy Act which treated transfers made
within four months of the date of filing as preferences. 11 U.S.C. § 95a(t) (1976). In the case
of transfers to insiders, defined infra at note 37, the trustee may avoid transfers made within
a year of bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
8. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(5) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). The transfer of property to a
priority creditor does not constitute a preference unless the bankrupt's assets prove insufficient
to pay all of the priority class claims. See, e.g., In re Flick, 105 F. 503 (S.D. Ohio 1900).
9. See 11 U.S.C. 547(0 (1982), discussed supra note 6.
10. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(5) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985), discussed supra note 8. See
generally § 507(a) setting forth a list of priority creditors. 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(1)-(7) (West
1979 & Supp. 1985).
11. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(1)-(5) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). E.g., Sportfame of Ohio, Inc.
v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. (In re Sportfame of Ohio, Inc.), 40 Bankr. 47, 55 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1984).
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Until recently it was generally conceded that there was no section 547(c)
defense to preference liability under the above facts.' 2 Section 547(c)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 did provide creditors with a defense
(2) to the extent that such transfer was(A) in payment of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of business
or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred;
(C) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of
the debtor and the transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms.' 3
However, even if the debt was incurred and made in the ordinary course of
business and was paid according to ordinary business terms, most courts
would have held that the debt described above was incurred on January 1.14
Thus, the payment was not made within 45 days after such debt was incurred,
and there could be no section 547(c)(2) defense.
On July 10, 1984, Congress amended section 547(c)(2) to remove the 45day limitation. Section 547(c)(2) now provides creditors with a defense
(2) to the extent that such transfer was(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary
course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of
the debtor and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms.15
The amended statute provides Creditor in the above example with a defense
to preference liability.' 6
It is not clear, however, what Congress intended concerning other cases
where there is potential preference liability. For example, it was generally
held prior to the recent amendment that credit card customers "incur" a
7
debt within the meaning of section 547(c)(2) at the time of the charge .

12. See Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 47-60 and authorities cited infra at notes 59-60.
13. 11 U.S.C. 547(c)(2) (1982).
14. See infra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
15. 11 U.S.C.A. 547(c)(2) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
16. See 130 CONG. REc. S8897 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statements of Sen. DeConcini and

Sen. Dole), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 65-66.
17. See, e.g., Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), discussed infra at
text accompanying notes 47-60. See also In re Brown, 20 Bankr. 554 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
During the 90 days preceding the debtor's filing of his petition in Brown, the defendant credit
card company made three billings and received payments totalling $6,664.36. Id. at 555. The
defendant argued that since it did not expect payment until after a monthly bill was issued,
the debt was not incurred until after the bill was in fact sent to the debtor. Id. at 556. In
analyzing the defendant's argument, the court noted that
Itihe debtor's obligation to the defendant ... arises out of a series of unconnected
transactions with various independent suppliers of goods and services ....
When
the debtor elected to charge the item as a credit transaction, a credit card was
employed.... At this point a credit obligation "was incurred." Credit was
extended and a debt was created.
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Thus, the 45-day period began to run from the time the goods were purchased, not from the time the cardholder received a statement from the
credit card company. Although that issue is now resolved, 8 new section
547(c)(2) does not appear to place any limitation on the length of time
that the debtor has to repay the debt. As long as the debt is incurred
according to "ordinary business terms" and paid in the "ordinary course
of business," there is a section 547(c)(2) defense.' 9 Thus, in the original
example, if the entire balance of the note was due on July 1 but was not
paid until December 1, there may be a defense under section 547(c)(2). It
is not clear, however, that this result was what Congress intended.
New section 547(c)(2) may also render section 547(c)(4) 20 superfluous while
22
2
substantially undermining the scope of sections 547(c)(1) 1 and 547(c)(5).
Section 547(c)(1) provides a defense for transactions that were intended to
be contemporaneous exchanges but technically were not. 23 Section 547(c)(4)
provides a credit against preference liability to those transferees who give
the debtor "new value" after receiving a preferential transfer. 24 As demonstrated below,25 most of the payments made in the course of transactions
that could be given complete protection under section 547(c)(1) and partial
protection under section 547(c)(4) are incurred and made in "ordinary course
of business" and are paid "according to ordinary business terms." Thus, a
defense may exist under amended section 547(c)(2). Section 547(c)(5) provides
a defense for inventory and accounts receivables lenders. 26 Because payments
to such lenders usually will meet subsection (c)(2) payment criteria, it again
appears that a defense is available.
This article examines the legislative history behind original section 547(c)(2)
and then examines the meager legislative history behind the recent amendment. The article also describes the potentially devastating effect the amendment will have on the trustee's ability to avoid preferential transfers. Finally,
the article analyzes several arguments that bankruptcy trustees are likely to
advance for giving section 547(c)(2) a limited construction.

I.

THE HISTORY OF 1978 SECTION 547(c)(2)

The rationale for including a section 547(c)(2) defense appears to be in
response to Congress' 1978 decision to ease the trustee's burden in estab-

18. See, e.g., Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981);
Bankr. 554 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982), and supra text accompanying note 17.
19. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(2) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (1982). See infra text accompanying note 81 for
of the subsection.
21. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1982). See infra text accompanying note 77 for
of the subsection.
22. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). See infra note 90
text of the subsection.
23. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 77-81.
26. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.

In re Brown, 20
the complete text
the complete text
for the complete
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lishing a preference. Prior to 1978, it was necessary for the trustee to prove
that, at the time of transfer, the debtor was "insolvent ' 27 and the transferee
had "reasonable cause to believe that the debtor [was] insolvent. ' 28 While
the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement was not an element of a
preference, the trustee needed to prove its existence in order to void the
transaction.29 The trustee's job of proving insolvency was virtually impossible
since many debtors' records were in disarray. 30 In any event, both requirements were difficult to establish. In 1978, Congress dealt with the insolvency
problem by creating a "presumption ' 31 of insolvency which required the
transferee to come forward with some evidence of solvency in order to shift
32
the burden of proof to the trustee.
Application of the "reasonable cause" requirement also proved to be less
than satisfactory. Some commentators questioned whether a preferred transferee should enjoy the benefits of the preference even where the transferee
had no knowledge about the debtor's financial affairs. 33 Arguably, Congress should decide through the priority section which claims are paid and
which ones are not. Further, the debtor should not be permitted to defeat
this legislative policy simply by making preferential payments on the eve of
bankruptcy. Moreover, many transferees may have known about the debtor's
financial condition but, because of their familiarity with bankruptcy law,
were not willing to admit such knowledge. In cases where there was evidence
that the transferee was aware of the debtor's financial condition, there seemed
to be no consistency as to when "reasonable cause to believe insolvency"
existed. Many courts required transferees who had some knowledge of fi-

27. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1976). Under the Bankruptcy Act a
person [was] deemed insolvent ...whenever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed,
removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed, with intent to defraud, hinder,
or delay his creditors, shall not at fair valuation be sufficient in any amount to
pay his debts.
11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1975).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1975).
29. The factors which caused a transfer to be regarded as a preference were set forth in §
60a of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1976). The preference was, in turn, regarded
as voidable only if the requirements of § 60b were met. 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1975). Section 60b
required the trustee to prove that the transferee had a "reasonable cause to believe" that the
debtor was insolvent.
30. See, e.g., Dinkelspiel v. Weaver, 116 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Ark. 1953). The district court
in Dinkelspiel ruled that evidence consisting of a balance sheet and a profit and loss statement
based upon assumptions and uncertainties and concerning the non-payment of the debtor's
checks and notes was insufficient to find insolvency at the time of the transfer. Id. at 459.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 547(0 (1982).
32. See S. RaP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1978). See supra note 6 and accompanying
text. See also Campbell v. Cannington (In re Economy Milling Co.), 37 Bankr. 914 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1983) (upholding the validity of § 547(0 against the challenge that it violates due process
in part on the basis that § 547(0 merely requires the creditor to come forward with some evidence
of solvency).
33. See, e.g., Morris, Bankruptcy Law Reform: Preferences, Secret Liens and Floating
Liens, 54 MINN. L. REV. 737, 738-40 (1970).
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nancial problems of the debtor to inquire further into the debtor's financial
affairs.14 They then charged the transferee with knowledge of those facts
that an inquiry would have revealed. 5 The "reasonable cause" requirement
evolved into something that the trustee had to establish without the benefit
of any standards.
The Bankruptcy Commission 6 proposed that the reasonable cause re34. See, e.g., Hoppe v. Rittenhouse, 279 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1960) (reasonable cause to believe
a debtor insolvent depends on whether the facts known to the creditor and any additional facts
the creditor may be charged with would produce such a belief in a reasonably prudent business
person); Boston Nat'l Bank v. Early, 17 F.2d 691 (Ist Cir. 1927) (the test for whether a creditor
had reasonable cause to believe a debtor was insolvent is whether facts were such as to put
the creditor on inquiry, which would have disclosed the debtor's insolvency); Miller v. Wells
Fargo Bank Int'l Corp., 406 F. Supp. 452 (D.C.N.Y.) (a creditor may not preserve his ignorance
of the debtor's financial condition), aff'd, 540 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1979); Stein v. Rand Constr.
Co., 400 F. Supp. 944 (D.C.N.Y. 1974) (a creditor's inquiry as to a debtor's financial state,
directed only to the debtor, is insufficient to prove that the creditor lacked reasonable cause
to believe in the debtor's insolvency where the circumstances are such that an ordinary prudent
person would make further inquiries).
35. See, e.g., Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank Int'l Corp., 406 F. Supp. 452 (D.C.N.Y.), aff'd,
540 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1979); Mack v. Bank of Lansing, 396 F. Supp. 935 (W.D. Mich. 1975)
(facts which are sufficient to incite an ordinary reasonable person to make inquiry into the
debtor's solvency charge the creditor with all knowledge he could have gained from such
inquiry); Stein v. Rand Constr. Co., 400 F. Supp. 944 (D.C.N.Y. 1974) (a creditor cannot
deliberately maintain his ignorance of the debtor's financial condition; the creditor is chargeable
with all of the facts which reasonably prudent inquiry into the debtor's solvency would reveal).
36. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Law of the United States was established by Public
Law 91-354 on July 24, 1970. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468, 46869 (1970). The Commission was formed to study, analyze, evaluate and recommend changes
both in the substance and administration of bankruptcy.
Public Law 91-354 created a Commission consisting of nine members. Those members were
Harold Marsh-Chairman, Wilson Newman, Charles Seglison, Senator Quentin Burdick, Senator Marlow Cook, Representative Don Edwards, Representative Charles Wiggins, Judge Edward Weinfeld and Judge Hurbert Wills. The Commission staff consisted of an executive
director, a deputy director, a research specialist and an administrative officer. Frank R.
Kennedy, a prominent professor from the University of Michigan Law School and a reporter
for the Rules Committee of the Judicial Committee, was appointed as Executive Director.
Public Law 91-354, as enacted, provided for a two-year life for the Commission. The Commission did not formally commence its operations until June, 1971, nearly 11 months after its
originally allotted time. Therefore, Congress extended the life of the Commission by Public
Law 93-56 through August, 1973. Act of July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-56, 87 Stat. 140 (1973).
After conducting four public hearings and 44 days of Commission deliberation, a two-part
report was submitted to Congress on July 31, 1973. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Part I consisted
of an evaluation of bankruptcy administration with recommendations for change. Part II
embodied a proposed bankruptcy statute with explanatory notes. The Commission's statutory
proposal was introduced as a bill in the House of Representatives in 1973. H.R. 10792, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). A comparable bill was introduced in the Senate at that time. S. 4046,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). In 1974, a competing bill, proposed by the National Conference
of Bankruptcy Judges was also introduced into the House. H.R. 16643, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974). Scant legislative action was taken during the 93d Congress with respect to the proposed
bankruptcy bills. However, an intense study of the proposed bankruptcy legislation occurred
during the 94th Congress. The Commission's proposal was reintroduced during that session.
H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The competing bill by the bankruptcy judges was also
reintroduced. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). In the Senate, the Commission's bill was
resubmitted, S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), as was the bankruptcy judges' proposal. S.
235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). For further discussion on the history of the Commission,
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quirement be eliminated for non-insider

7

cases.3 8 This position eventually

39

became law in 1978. Moreover,
on July 10, 1984, the requirement was
40
dropped even for insider cases.
The Commission, however, did not gauge the concern that the dropping
of this test would cause trade creditors. Total abandonment of the "reasonable cause" requirement would have converted virtually any payment to
trade creditors during the statutory period of presumed insolvency into a
preference. For example, in cases where an insolvent debtor pays his supplier
at the end of the month in the usual course of business, the creditor likely
would have no knowledge of the debtor's insolvency. Prior to 1978, the
payments could not have been recaptured. If, however, the "reasonable
cause" requirement were dropped, then the trustee could recover such payments.
Additionally, in pre-1978 cases, where the debtor received an unsecured
loan to be repaid in installments, the trustee could not avoid the transfers.
If the debtor was current in his payments, then the creditor most likely
would not have had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
Thus, those payments could not have been recaptured before 1978 even
though they were made within the statutory period.
The National Bankruptcy Conference was the first to recognize the vulnerable position that the proposed abolition of the "reasonable cause to
believe insolvency" would have created for utility companies. 4' In 1977, H.R.
see Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 Am. BANKR. L.J. 275, 276-79
(1980).
37. An insider, as defined in the Bankruptcy Code, generally includes the debtor's relatives
and those people associated closely with him in a business enterprise. 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)
(1982). Prior to elimination of the reasonable cause requirement, when a transfer involved an
insider, the Code allowed the trustee to avoid a transfer made within one year of the filing
petition in bankruptcy, but only if the trustee could prove the transferee "had reasonable cause
to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of such transfer . . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B)
(1982).
38. Also, the Commission does not believe that the requirement that there be a certain
state of mind on the part of the favored creditor has any rational connection with the
objective of this provision, i.e., to achieve a more equitable distribution among
all of the creditors. The complete irrationality of the present requirement is
demonstrated by the fact that if a debtor turned all of his property into cash and
wrote a check to his brother, who was one of his creditors but who lived abroad
and had paid no attention whatever to the condition of the business, this payment
would not be a voidable preference even if effected the day before the filing of
a petition in bankruptcy. Since we have assumed that the brother knew nothing
whatever about the debtor's financial affairs, it is obvious that he would not have
had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. Yet this fact has
no bearing on the injustice to the other creditors. The Commission recommends
that this requirement for a voidable preference be eliminated.
COMMUNICATION FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS,
TRANSMITTING A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS, H.R. Doc. No. 137,

I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1973).
39. 11" U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982).
40. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
41. The Conference proposed that a "debt for utilities incurred within three months of the
petition" be excepted from liability. HEARINGS ON H.R. 31; AND H.R. 32 HOUSE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1849 (1976).
PART
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was introduced which proposed new section 547(c)(2). Although the

legislative history is sparse, 43 the inference is inescapable that objections from

trade creditors were intense. As proposed, H.R. 6 provided trade creditors
with a defense for payments made in the "ordinary course of business.""4
Language protecting payments made "in ordinary course of.. . or financial
affairs of the debtor" was added later. 45 Because the initial bill emphasized

only the "business" aspect of the transaction, 46 it is probable that the trade
creditors were the first to object. Only later was it proposed that payments

made by consumer debtors in the ordinary course of their "financial affairs"
be protected.
II.

APPLICATION OF

1978 SECTION 547(c)(2): THE RULE

OF BARASH v. PUBLIC FINANCE CORP.

One of the earliest constructions of 1978 section 547(c)(2) was provided
by the Seventh Circuit in Barash v. Public Finance Corp.47 In Barash, the
trustee attempted to recapture payments made during the 90-day preference

period in eight separate cases. In each case the creditor was undersecured.
The court decided two questions: first, whether elements of a preference
existed, and second, and more importantly, whether a defense existed under
section 547(c)(2).

As to the first question, the principal issue was whether payments to a
partially secured creditor were preferential. The creditors argued that there

42. H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
43. An intensive search of the relevant legislative history from the issuing of the Commission
Report to the introduction of H.R. 6 does not reveal any statements, other than that of the
Bankruptcy Conference, setting forth a need for a section like § 547(c)(2).
44. H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 547(c)(2) (1977) read as follows:
(c) The trustee may not avoid a transfer under this section(2) to the extent that such transfer was(A) in payment of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of business
of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred;
(C) made in the ordinary course of business of the debtor and the
transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms.
45. The inclusion of the "financial affairs" language was first proposed in a bill introduced
in the Senate. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 547(c)(2) (1977). The bill provided:
(c) The Trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer(2) to the extent that such transfer was(A) in payment of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of business
or financial affairs of the debtor and transferee;

(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred;
(C) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms.
Id. (emphasis added). See also S. Rm,. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1978).
46. See supra note 44.

47. 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
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were no preferential payments because they were secured. 4 s The court looked,
however, to section 506(a). 49 That section gave the creditors two claims, one
secured and another unsecured. The unsecured claim was determined by the
extent to which the claim exceeded the value of the security. Since the
payments were being applied to the unsecured portion of the creditors' claim,
the court found that they met all section 547(b) requirements and were
50
therefore preferential.
As to the second and main point, the court ruled that there could be no
section 547(c)(2) defense. The court conceded that all of the elements of the
defense were present except the requirement that the payment be made "not
later than 45 days after [the] debt was incurred."'" In all eight cases, the
debts were incurred and paid in the ordinary course of business or financial
affairs of the debtor. In addition, they were paid according to ordinary
business terms. The court, however, ruled that each debt was incurred at
the time that the notes were originally signed, not at the time when the
installment payment was due. Thus, each payment occurred more than 45
days after the debt was incurred.
In so deciding, the court rejected arguments advanced by Professor Henson
who advocated that the section should be construed so that the 45-day period
began to run at the time that the installment was due. 52 Rather, the court
accepted the analysis set forth in Collier on Bankruptcy,53 and by Mr.
Levin,5 4 a member of the House Staff at the time the legislation was drafted.
That analysis suggested that the time period should begin to run from the
date that the debtors received their loans. Collier stated that in utility cases
the period started from the time that the "resource was consumed. ' 55 Levin
indicated that the 45-day period was chosen because 45 days was within a

48. A payment to a secured creditor is not preferential because one of the elements of a
preference, namely, that the creditor has not improved his position with respect to other

creditors, is not met.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982) provides:

An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate
has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's
interest in the estate's interest in such property ... and is an unsecured claim to
the extent that the value of such creditor's interest ... is less than the amount
of such allowed claim.

See, e.g., In re Klein, 10 Bankr. 657 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Jones, 5 Bankr. 736 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1980) (holding that the partially secured creditor's claim should be divided into a secured
and unsecured claim). See generally H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 356 (1977).
50. Barash, 658 F.2d at 507-09.

51. Id. at 509.

52. Henson, The Uniform Commercial Code and the New Bankruptcy Act: Some Problem
Areas, 35 Bus. LAW. 83, 96 (1979).
53. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 547.38 (15th ed. 1980).
54. See Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee'sAvoiding Powers, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173

(1979).

55. 4

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

§

547.38 (15th ed. 1980).
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normal billing cycle for trade creditors.16 Thus, the court reasoned that
Congress had no intention of protecting those payments made pursuant to
an unsecured installment note where payments were made 45 or more days
after the loan. The court acknowledged that the payments did not result
from unusual action by either the debtors or creditors and, thus, the creditors
complained that they "had no way of knowing that the debtors were having
financial difficulties."" The court responded:
The short answer to this argument is that the creditor's knowledge or
state of mind is no longer relevant. Under the predecessor to § 547...
the Trustee had to establish that the creditor had "reasonable cause to
believe" that a debtor was insolvent before a transfer could be avoided.
Congress eliminated this requirement in favor of the objective criteria
under the new Code.58
Virtually all cases following Barash have embraced its reasoning. 9
It may be surmised that most trade creditors disagree with the Seventh
Circuit's analysis. It certainly would have been advantageous to those creditors if they could have had the additional time that would have been provided
if the 45-day period began to run from the date that a bill was sent. The
court ruled, however, that the 45-day period began from the time that the
product was purchased or the resource was consumed. For example, if a
product was purchased on the 15th of the month, but the bill was not sent
until the 30th, then under Barash, the 45-day period began running on the
15th. 60

56. See Levin, supra note 54, at 186. The language of the jointly issued House and Senate
reports tends to reinforce this view:
The second exception protects ordinary course of business (or financial affairs,
where a business is not involved) transfers. For the case of a consumer, the
paragraph uses the phrase "financial affairs" to include such nonbusiness activities
as payment of monthly utility bills. If the debt on account of which the transfer
was made was incurred in the ordinary course of both the debtor and the transferee,
if the transfer was made not later than 45 days after the debt was incurred, if
the transfer itself was made in the ordinary course of both the debtor and the
transferee, according to ordinary business terms, then the transfer is protected.
The purpose of this exception is to leave undisturbed normal financial relations,
because it does not detract from the general policy of the preference section to
discourage unusual action by either the debtor or his creditors during the debtor's
slide into bankruptcy.
H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373-74 (1977); S.Rae. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
88 (1978).
57. Barash, 658 F.2d at 510.
58. Id.

59. See, e.g., Sandoz v. Fred Wilson Drilling Co. (Matter of Emerald Oil Co.), 695 F.2d
833 (5th Cir. 1983); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc. (In re Ken Gardner
Ford Sales, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 743 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); Iowa Premium Serv. Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank (In re Iowa Premium Serv. Co.), 695 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir. 1982). The court in Iowa
did follow the generally accepted principle that interest payments were not recoverable by the
trustee because interest was deemed to be incurred daily.
60. Rovzar v. Prime Leather Finishes (In re Saco Local Dev. Corp.), 30 Bankr. 859 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1983); Keydata Corp. v. Boston Edison Co. (In re Keydata Corp.), 37 Bankr. 324 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1983); Eckles v. Pan Am. Mktg. (In re Balducci Oil Co.), 33 Bankr. 843 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1983).
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Furthermore, while trade creditors may have been displeased, unsecured
lenders must have been in an outright state of anguish. All payments made
beyond the 45-day period on unsecured or partially secured notes were
preferential if made within 90 days of bankruptcy. This was true even if
the payments were regular under the terms of the note and if the creditor
was completely unaware of the debtor's financial difficulties.
III.

1984 SECTION 547(c)(2)

As noted above, 6' new section 547(c)(2) changes the old provision by
eliminating the 45-day requirement. One additional amendment apparently
was made for purposes of clarity. It requires that the debt now must be
incurred "by the debtor." 62 Thus, there is no defense to the trustee's preference claim if the debt was not initially incurred "by the debtor." If someone
other than the debtor incurred the debt, an "insider ' 63 for instance, then
any payments made by the debtor on that debt will not be protected by
section 547(c)(2) from an attack by the trustee.
The available legislative history reveals that Congress intended to eliminate
the 45-day provision, thereby overruling Barash, but intended to leave the
section otherwise unchanged. The Senate Report reads:
This section eliminates the 45 day limitation contained in section 547
(c)(2). The limitation places undue burdens upon creditors who receive
payment under business contracts providing for billing cycles greater than
45 days.6
However, the most revealing portion of the legislative history, an important
exchange between Senators Dole and DeConcini, indicates that payments on
unsecured debt are intended to fall within the new section 547(c)(2) defense:
Mr. DeCONCINI. I know that the Senator from Kansas, along with
the Senator from South Carolina, 65 was the principal sponsor of this
provision deleting subsection (c)(2) of section 547 of the code, and I
would like to clarify two points regarding the effect of this change.
Am I correct that the elimination of the 45-day restriction in subsection
(c)(2) of section 547 will relieve buyers of commercial paper with maturities in excess of 45 days of the concern that repayments of such paper
at maturity might be considered as preferential transfers?
Mr. DOLE. That is correct, assuming that the "ordinary course of
business or financial affairs" and "ordinary business terms" requirements
are met.

61. See supra text accompanying note 15.
62. Id.
63. See supra note 37 for the definition of an "insider." It would be somewhat unusual
for a debtor to pay the debt of another. Perhaps it is most likely to occur in cases where the
debt paid was incurred by someone closely connected with the debtor. The Code's definition
of an "insider" covers most entities closely connected with the debtor.
64. S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1983).
65. Referring to Senator Strom Thurmond, Republican, South Carolina.
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Mr. DeCONCINI. Would there be any doubt that companies that have
a need for short-term funds, and investors who wish to purchase shortterm obligations, would be acting in their respective "ordinary course
of business or financial affairs" if they were to deal directly or indirectly
with each other in commercial paper market? And would not the payment
of a commercial paper note at maturity be in accordance with "ordinary
business terms"?
Mr. DOLE. Those understandings are correct. The commercial market
is an established market, and the participants in it would presumably be
acting in ordinary course of their business or financial affairs and on
the basis of ordinary business terms.-

Unfortunately, of the legislative history which does exist, only the Senate
Report and this exchange are of any real value in an attempt to uncover and
to understand the legislative intent. Although there is evidence in prior
hearings and proposals to amend section 547(c)(2), that protection for obligations such as irrevocable67 letters of credit was being considered, the
important and persuasive history remains the dialogue between Senators Dole
and DeConcini which occurred prior to adoption of the amended section
547(c)(2). 68 Although the historical gaps are troublesome, one is able to
ascertain some things about the scope and limitations of the new provision.
Certainly, the limitations that existed prior to 1984, other than the 45-day
period, still apply. Thus, debts must be incurred and paid by the debtor
according to the "ordinary business or financial affairs of the debtor" and
must be paid "according to ordinary business terms. '69 Neither the 1978
Act itself nor its legislative history further defines or refines "ordinary course
of business or financial affairs" or "ordinary business terms." Some of the
pre-amendment history suggests that atypical or unusual transactions were
not to be covered.70 Reference to analagous issues governed by the Uniform
Commercial Code is also helpful. 7' While one could speculate about whether,
66. 130 CONG. REc. S8897 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
67. S. 3023, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980); Preference Section of the Bankruptcy Code: Hearings Before Subcomm. on JudicialMachinery of the Senate JudiciaryComm. on S. 3023, 96th
Cong. 2d Sess. (Aug. 18, 1980). Professor Vern Countryman, in his forthcoming article in Vanderbilt Law Review, gives a complete and detailed history of amended § 547(c)(2), but it provides
no greater insights than those alluded to here. The references to buying of commercial paper
clearly show that Congress was focusing upon this rather narrow area and had not fully contemplated the scope of the amendment.
68. See supra note 66.
69. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(2) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
70. "The purpose of this exception is to leave undisturbed normal financial relations, because
it does not detract from the general policy of the preference section to discourage unusual
action by either the debtor or his creditors during the debtor's slide into bankruptcy." H.R.
RaP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373-74 (1977) (emphasis added).
71. For example, UCC 2-403 and 9-307(1) give protection, under stated conditions, to
"buyers in ordinary course of business" (emphasis added). Section 1-201(9) defines "buyer in
ordinary course of business" as, among other things, buying "in ordinary course" of business.
Case law interpretation of the section, however, focuses on the nature of the purchase, which
is of little help in analyzing questions about incurring and paying debts. See, e.g., Martin
Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 745 (3rd Cir. 1979) (bulk sale does not
qualify as sale in "ordinary course" of business); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Leo's
Used Car Exch., 314 F. Supp. 254 (D. Mass. 1970) (purchase of cars at a place other than
the seller's usual place of business was not a sale in ordinary course of business); National
Shawmut Bank v. Vera, 352 Mass. 11, 223 N.E.2d 515 (1967) (purchase at a judicial sale not
a purchase in ordinary course of business).
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for example, a debtor's vacation charges are in the "ordinary course of his
financial affairs," it is revealing that the courts have rarely struck down a
section 547(c)(2) defense on the basis that the payments were not made in
72
ordinary course of business or according to ordinary business terms.
Given the exchange between Senators Dole and DeConcini, it seems clear
that timely payments made on an unsecured note are now within the defense.
In addition, since payments to trade creditors were always covered, those
payments should continue to be protected.
One can also comfortably assert that this section is not intended to provide
a defense to creditors taking security which would otherwise be preferential.
The reasons for this are threefold. First, subsection (c)(2) is limited to
"payment" of debt. One cannot plausibly argue that the giving of security
constitutes "payment" because the security is given to assure payment but
does not constitute it. Rarely does the secured creditor at the time of the
transaction believe he is buying the debtor's collateral. 73 Second, the drafters
of the Bankruptcy Code followed the prior law and erected rather elaborate
mechanisms which would be rendered superfluous if new section 547(c)(2)
applied to security interests. 7 Finally, most courts have not applied other

72. See, e.g., Gennet v. Coastal Wholesale, Inc. (In re Martin County Custom Pools Inc.), 37
Bankr. 52 (Bankr. S.D. 1984); Economy Milling Co. v. Campbell (In re Economy), 37 Bankr.
914 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1983); Tinnell Traffic Servs. v. Bradford-White Corp. (In re Tinnell Traffic
Services Inc.), 41 Bankr. 1018 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); Craig Oil Co. v. Marathon Oil Co.
(Matter of Craig Oil Co.), 31 Bankr. 402 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983). See generally Duncan,
Loan Payment to Secured Creditorsas Preferences Under the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendment,
64 NEB. L. REv. 83, 89 n.26 (1984).
Generally, courts do not distinguish between transactions made in the ordinary course of
business and those made according to ordinary business terms. One court, however, appeared
to make this distinction. It expressly held that purchases made by letters of credit were in the
ordinary course of business when such letters are issued according to ordinary business terms.
In re Hard Ski Mfg. Co., 7 Bankr. 465, 469 (1980). The court defined ordinary business terms
according to the "ordinary method" of transacting the particular business at issue. Id.
73. See Gennet v. Coastal Wholesale, Inc. (In re Martin County Custom Pools Inc.), 37
Bankr. 52 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (holding that when debtor-buyer permitted the creditorseller to take back items of inventory that no "payment" had occurred within the meaning of
the section).
74. See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(I), (2) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). Section 547(e)(2)(A)
provides that the date of transfer shall be the time the "transfer takes effect between the
transferor and transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after such time."
In cases involving real property, "perfection" is defined as that point in time "when a bona
fide purchaser of such property from the debtor against whom applicable law permits such
transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest that is superior to the interest of the
transferee." 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(A) (1982). In the case of fixtures and personal property,
perfection is defined as that point in time "when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire
a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee." 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (1978).
In general, if perfection occurs beyond the 10-day period, the day of transfer becomes the date
of perfection. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(B) (1982) (providing that the date of transfer shall be "at
the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected after such 10 days."); e.g., In
re Kelley, 3 Bankr. 651 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980) (holding a security interest in an automobile
voidable under § 547 because the lien was noted on the certificate of title beyond the 10-day
period).
In addition to the elaborate rules defining "transfer," subsection (c) sets forth two separate
defenses for secured transaction cases. Section 547(c)(3) creates a defense for purchase money
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subsection (c) defenses to secured transactions cases. 5
With this much established, however, even a slightly expansive reading of
new section 547(c)(2) may have the practical effect of eliminating preference
liability for almost all payments to unsecured creditors within the 45-day
period. Assuming that most preference transactions are business-related, it

will be indeed rare that a court could not conclude that a section 547(c)(2)
defense is available. Certainly the typical business or consumer loan is
incurred in the "ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor." The debtor will usually go to a bank, sign the necessary documents,
and borrow the money. Repayment of such debts invariably will be in

furtherance of the debtor's business or financial affairs. Finally, the mode
of payment, either by check or cash, will be considered as being within

"ordinary business terms." There will be a rare case where a debtor incurs
and pays a gambling debt (a debt not incurred within the ordinary course
or financial affairs of the debtor, unless, of course, he is a professional
gambler) or pays a debt by barter (and therefore will not have paid according
to "ordinary business terms"). But, in the usual case it will be difficult to
find a case in which a preferential payment would not fall within the language
of the section as commonly understood.

There are good reasons for believing that Congress did not intend to
totally emasculate the preference section, or, in fact, that Congress did not

even consider general preference law when amending subsection (c)(2). The
most compelling is the effect of the suggested construction of subsection

(c)(2) upon the remaining subsection (c) defenses. For example, subsection
547(c)(1) was not amended in 1984. That section provides that a defense
shall exist:

security interests that are "perfected on or before 10 days after the debtor receives possession"
of the collateral. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(3) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). Section 547(c)(5) validates
the so-called floating lien on inventory and receivables provided that the secured party has not
improved his position within the 90-day period prior to bankruptcy "to the prejudice of other
creditors holding unsecured claims" II U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
It simply is highly unlikely that, in enacting § 547(c)(2), Congress intended to render those
provisions governing secured transactions meaningless. If § 547(c)(2) does apply, then creditors
could conceivably take security interests within any reasonable time after the loan and be
protected. The 10-day provisions set out in § 547(e)(1), (e)(2) and (e)(3) would be superfluous.
75. Several courts have held that subsection (c)(1), see infra discussion at text accompanying
notes 76-79, does not apply to secured transactions. See, e.g., Gower v. Ford Motor Credit
Co. (In re Davis), 734 F.2d 604 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1294 (1984); Ray v. Security
Mut. Fin. Corp. (In re Arnett), 731 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Enlow, 20 Bankr. 480 (Bankr.
S.D. Ind. 1982); In re Christion, 8 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981). Butsee General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Martella (In re Martella), 22 Bankr. 649 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982); John
v. First Tennessee Bank (In re Burnette), 14 Bankr. 795 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981).
It is clear, however, that § 547(c)(1) can be applied conceptually to secured transactions. An
example would be where the debtor and creditor agree at the outset that security would be
given for the loan and, in fact, was so given reasonably soon thereafter. The antecedency
created by the brief delay in the transfer of security is quite obviously not the "type" of
antecedency which § 547 seeks to attack. The exception of the trustee's avoidance power was
recognized under the old act as well. See Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (1917) (delay between
the value and transfer (mortgage) of seven days).
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(1)

to the extent that such transfer was(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose
benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous
exchange for new value given to the debtor; and 6
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange.1

The legislative history and commentary reveal that this section was primarily
directed to the debtor who pays by check.7 The transferee may have given

the consideration, a car for example, and may have accepted the debtor's
check as payment for the goods. Although a check is commonly treated as
a cash transaction, in reality it is a credit transaction. 78 The drafters, therefore, created a defense for those parties who take a check as payment for
goods.

Suppose, however, that the check bounces. After two months, Creditor
resubmits the check or Debtor issues another one within 90 days of his
bankruptcy. This time the check clears. Under these facts it is very doubtful
that subsection (c)(1) would apply. 79 The exchange is not "in fact a substantially comtemporaneous" one as the section requires. One can argue,
however, that new section 547(c)(2) could apply under certain circumstances.
Some debtors have an unfortunate habit of submitting NSF checks. Their
creditors may have no choice but to resubmit them. These transactions may
very well be according
to "ordinary course of business" and within "ordinary
80
business terms."
76. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1982).
77. The first exception is for a transfer that was intended by all parties to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value, and was in fact substantially contemporaneous.
Normally, a check is a credit transaction. However, for purposes of this paragraph,
a transfer involving a check is considered to be "intended to be contemporaneous,"
and if the check is presented for payment in the normal course of affairs, which
the Uniform Commercial Code specifies as 30 days, U.C.C. section 3-503(2)(a),
that will amount to a transfer that is "in fact substantially contemporaneous."
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373-74 (1977). See also Levin, An Introduction to
the Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 186 (1979).
78. U.C.C. § 3-409 generally provides that "[a] check or other draft does not of itself
operate as an assignment of any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its payment,
and the drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts it." Until payment or acceptance
of the check, the payee has only an expectancy of payment.
79. The legislative history supports the position that a bounced check does not receive §
547(c)(1) protection: "Contrary to language contained in the House Report, payment of a debt
by means of a check is equivalent to a cash payment, unless the check is dishonored. Payment
is considered to be made when the check is delivered for purposes of sections 547(c)(1) and
(2)." 124 CoNa. REc. 34,000 (1978) (emphasis added).

80. For example, in Ewald Bros., Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 45 Bankr. 52 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984),
the court held that tendering and resubmission of three NSF checks did not satisfy the "ordinary
course" requirement.
Plaintiff and Defendant established a course of business of making payments on
their debts through check transfers. Prior to [the year of bankruptcy], Plaintiff
had never submitted payment in the form of an NSF check. Moreover, while
there was some evidence indicating that payment by NSF check might have
occurred on two other occasions ... such should not suffice to alter an already
established and substantially continuing payment practice.
Id.at 57-58.
While the court did not believe that a course of dealing had been established, more instances
of the creditor taking NSF checks likely would have forced the court to accept the defense.
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Subsection (c)(4) also was not amended in 1984. That section gives preferred creditors a set-off against the trustee's preference claim for any credit
given the debtor after the creditor has received a preferential transfer. A
defense is available
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such
transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the
debtor(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest;
and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make
an otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit
of such creditor.81
Judge Swartzberg's opinion in In re Rustia12 is helpful in explaining the
application of this section. In Rustia, the debtor filed bankruptcy on November 18, 1981. One of the creditors was VISA. Within the crucial 90-day
period before bankruptcy, Debtor made the following payments and charges:
Payment

Charge

$163.00 September 9
$ 83.00 September 15

$225.00 September 17
$ 84.00 October 30

In addition, within the 90-day period the following payments and charges
were made with Mastercard:
Payment

Charge

$ 83.00 September 9
$ 81.00 September 15

$250.00 September 15
$ 88.00 October 30

Both creditors were claiming defenses under subsections (c)(1), (c)(2), and
(c)(4). Judge Swartzberg disposed of the subsection (c)(1) defense quickly.83
He also ruled that the subsection (c)(2) argument ran afoul of the 45-day
limitation because the payments could not be traced to any specific purchases.84 He did, however, give limited protection under subsection (c)(4).

81. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (1982).
82. 20 Bankr. 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
83. Id. at 133-34. The credit card companies argued that the debtor's outstanding credit
limit was $2,000.00. Payments were made to reduce the balance below $2,000.00, thereby
permitting the debtor to make further charges. The card companies argued, therefore, that there
was a "contemporaneous exchange": the debtor paid the companies, and, in exchange, they
permitted the debtor to make further charges. Judge Swartzberg ruled that this was not the
kind of "contemporaneous exchange" contemplated by the section. "The availability of credit
is not synonymous with the extension of credit; the estate is not augmented by the fact that
the debtors' payments resulted in restoring their line of credit to the extent of the payments."
Id. at 134.
84. Id. at 134-35.
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VISA had given new value on September 17 in the amount of $225.00 after
the preferential payments made on September 9 and 15. That $225.00 extension of credit was "netted" against the two prior payments thereby
limiting the trustee's recovery to $21.00.85 The Mastercard payment of $250.00
was greater than the prior preferential payments and, therefore, Judge

Swartzberg ruled that when the new value was netted against the preferential
payments, no recovery against Mastercard was available. As to the charge
occurring on October 30, however, the trustee was able to recover that
$88.00 in its entirety. The September 17 charge did not come after the
October 30 payment, as section 547(c)(4) required, and therefore could not
be netted against the October 30 payment.

While Judge Swartzberg correctly applied section 547(c)(4),8 6 the value of
his opinion, in light of the amendment to section 547(c)(2), is unclear. Recall
that the court's only basis for not applying subsection (c)(2) was the 45-day
rule. 7 Virtually all payments to trade creditors, who may also be giving

value as defined by section 547(c)(4) (e.g. credit card companies), are incurred
and paid in ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor
and are paid according to ordinary business terms. What then remains of
subsection (c)(4), practically speaking?
In addition, it appears that new section 547(c)(2) makes substantial inroads
on the scope of subsection (c)(5). The 1978 code validated, by means of
subsection (c)(5), the floating lien on the debtor's inventory88 and receivables,8 9 but only to the extent that in the 90-day period prior to bankruptcy
the secured creditor had not improved his position "to the prejudice of
other creditors holding unsecured claims." 90 It appears, however, that many
85. Id. at 135-36. The reader should also note that the 1984 amendments include a new
subsection (c)(7) defense for transfers involving consumer debts that are less than $600.00. The
new subsection provides for a defense "if, in a case filed by an individual debtor whose debts
are primarily consumer debts, the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected
by such transfer is less than $600.00." 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(7) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). It
seems clear that a transferee could combine a (c)(7) defense with other subsection (c) defenses.
See infra note 103 and accompanying text. Thus, the transferees in Rustia could have used new
subsection (c)(7) and subsection (c)(4) to eliminate their liability.
86. See Leathers v. Prime Leather Finishes Co., 40 Bankr. 248 (D. Me. 1984) (rejecting
the "net result rule"). Under the "net result" construction, all payments and credits are simply
balanced against one another with the difference being the amount of recovery.
is also given to the time the credits are given.
87. Rustia, 20 Bankr. at 134-35. Judge Swartzberg ruled that the debts and payments were
incurred and made in the ordinary course of financial affairs of the debtor. He also ruled that
they were to pay according to ordinary business terms. Id.
88. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(1) (1982) defines "inventory" as "personal property leased or
furnished, held for sale or lease, or to be furnished under a contract for service, raw materials,
work in process, or materials used or consumed in a business, including farm products such
as crops or livestock, held for sale or lease."
89. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(3) (1982) defines "receivable" as a "right to payment, whether or
not such right has been earned by performance."
90. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985) provides a defense for a transfer
(5) that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the
proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such transfers
to the transferee caused a reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition
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payments made to the inventory and receivable financier that could have
been recaptured before July 10, 1984, now are unavailable.
Assume, for example, that C, extended Debtor a $1,000,000 line of credit
on an unsecured basis. If it were understood between C, and Debtor that
Debtor is to pay as he is able, then a $100,000 payment made during the
90-day period likely would be made in ordinary course of business and
according to ordinary business terms. Thus, the payment would be protected
under section 547(c)(2).
Assume another creditor, C2, loans $1,000,000 and, in addition, demands
a security interest on inventory and receivables. Assume further that, on the
90th day prior to bankruptcy, the debt remains at $1,000,000 with the value
of inventory and receivables being $900,000. Thus, there exists a $100,000
insufficiency under the provisions of subsection (c)(5). 9 1 If Debtor decided
to pay C2 $100,000 on the eve of bankruptcy, then C 2 has improved his
position to the extent of $100,000, assuming that the amount of debt and
the value of collateral remained constant. Prior to July 10, 1984, the trustee
could have recovered the $100,000 from C 2 since subsection (c)(5) offers no
protection. 2 Today, however, C2 likely has a 547(c)(2) defense and the
$1,000 may not be recoverable. It is, of course, absurd and irrational to
hold that C 2, a creditor secured by inventory and receivables, should be
given less protection than an unsecured creditor. Apparently, only secured
transactions not involving inventory and receivables escape the effects of the
1984 amendment.
Congress must have intended that the other provisions of subsection (c)
have some practical effect. Furthermore, it is unclear whether Congress
intended more than to protect transferees who receive timely payment of
unsecured obligations whether they be payments to trade creditors or payments on lump sum or installment notes. Yet in doing so, Congress may
have unintentionally undermined other policies advanced by the other sub-

and to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims, of any amount
by which the debt secured by such security interest exceeded the value of all
security interests for such debt on the later of(A) (i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A)
of this section applies, 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B)
of -this section applies, one year before the date of the
filing of the petition; or
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the security
agreement creating such security interest.
91. Id. Section 547(c)(5)(A)(i) requires the court to compare the secured party's position
"90 days before the date of the filing of the petition" with his position "as of the date of
the filing of the petition."
92. Id. The statute requires the court to consider the "aggregate of all such transfers ......
11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). Section 101(48), in
stating that a "transfer" includes "every mode of ... parting with property," makes clear
that the payment of money constitutes a "transfer." 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(48) (West 1979 &
Supp. 1985).
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section (c) defenses. In the next section, the article discusses potential methods
that the courts may use to limit the scope of amended section 547(c)(2).

IV.

ARGUMENTS FOR LIMITING THE SCOPE OF
1984 SECTION 547(C)(2)

As preferential transferees will certainly rush to new section 547(c)(2),
trustees will also quickly attempt to limit the scope of the new amendment.
This section presents three of the most logical limitations, discussing both
their strengths and weaknesses.
Some trustees may attempt to limit subsection (c)(2) by asserting that the
subsection (c)(1) and (c)(4) defenses are exclusive. Thus, the argument runs
that, in cases of conflict between (c)(2) and (c)(1) or (c)(4), the (c)(1) and
(c)(4) defenses should control. Many courts have held that subsection (c)(3)'s
enabling loan defense was the only defense available to secured creditors
receiving purchase money security interests.93 If subsection (c)(3) has been
held to be an exclusive defense, then subsections (c)(1) and (c)(4) could be
as well.
The Eleventh Circuit recently held that a creditor could not look to
subsection (c)(1) when an "enabling loan'?94 was involved. In Gower v. Ford
Motor Credit Corp.,95 the debtor bought a Ford tractor from a Ford dealer
on August 6, 1981. While the debtor's installment sales contract, an "enabling loan" under subsection (c)(3), was assigned to Ford Credit on August
1lth, Ford Credit did not perfect until August 26th. Bankruptcy was filed
on November 16, 1981. Unfortunately for Ford Credit, subsection (c)(3)
'96
required perfection within "10 days after the security interest attaches.
Thus, subsection (c)(3) provided no defense to the preference attack. Ford
Credit argued that it had a defense under subsection (c)(1) in that a contemporaneous exchange was intended and that the exchange was in fact

93. See cases cited supra note 75.

94. Section 547(c)(3) provides that the trustee may not avoid a transfer
(3) of a security interest in property acquired by the debtor(A)

to the extent such security interest secures new value that was(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that contains a description of such property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and
(B) that is perfected before 10 days after such interest attaches.
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) (1982).
The principal change to § 547(c)(3) in 1984 was to require that the secured party perfect within
10 days after the debtor "receives possession." 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B) (West 1979 & Supp.

1985).
95. (In re Davis), 734 F.2d 604 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1294 (1984).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B) (1978). See supra note 94 for the language of the 1984

amendment to 547(c)(3)(B).
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substantially contemporaneous. Judge Kratvich would accept none of Ford's
argument:
Congress gave no indication that a security interest for an enabling loan
could qualify under subsection (c)(1). Rather, the statute and legislative
history explicitly state that Congress intended 547(c)(1) to exempt transactions involving payment by check and the like, and that 547(c)(3)
exempts credit transactions involving enabling loans. 9
To date, all of the reported cases discussing subsection (c) defenses have
involved conflicts between subsections (c)(1) and (c)(3). No court has explicitly ruled on the application of 547(c)(2) to secured transaction cases. 98
But in addition to the enabling loan exception, sections 547(e)(1) and (e)(2),9
which govern the time of transfer, generally accord the secured party only
10 days to perfect a security interest. '°° Permitting the secured party 45 days
to perfect his security interest (as old section 547(c)(2) did) would render
the more specific sections, which are directly applicable to secured transactions, meaningless.
Could the same argument be advanced regarding cases that fall within the
narrowly defined defenses set forth in subsections (c)(1) and (c)(4)? Judge
Kratvich asserted that section 547(c)(1) was enacted to protect, among others,
those transferees who are paid by check.' 0 Is subsection (c)(1) the exclusive
defense for cases where the transferee is paid by check?
There are two principal problems with this approach. First, to adopt it
would in effect write section 547(c)(2) out of the bankruptcy code. Section
547(c)(2) was originally designed to protect trade and other creditors, who
are often paid by check.' 0 2 Limiting section 547(c)(2)'s applicability to cash
cases would eliminate protection for most of those creditors. Moreover, if
Senators Dole and DeConcini had anticipated that some bankruptcy court
might rule that section 547(c)(2) did not protect payments by check, they
might have constructed their Senate dialogue to include reference to check
payments.

97. Gower, 734 F.2d at 607 (footnote omitted).
98. In Brent Explorations, Inc. v. Karst Enterprises, Inc. (In re Brent Explorations, Inc.),
31 Bankr. 745 (Bankr. D. Col. 1983), the court set aside a security interest because it was

unperfected under non-bankruptcy law and therefore voidable under 544(a)(1). 11 U.S.C. §
544(a)(1) (1982). The court then ruled that payments made during the 90-day period prior to
bankruptcy were preferential. Finally, the court assumed, without discussion, that the creditor
had a right to "invoke" a § 547(c)(2) defense. 31 Bankr. at 752. Ultimately, however, the court
ruled that the debt had been incurred beyond the 45-day period; therefore, § 547(c)(2) was not
available. With the 45-day requirement now dropped, the creditor in Brent Explorationsprobably
has a defense.
99. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(1), (2) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). See supra note 74.
100. E.g., In re Poteet, 5 Bankr. 631 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980) (voiding as preferential a
security interest on an automobile because it was perfected beyond the 10-day period).
101. See Gower, 734 F.2d at 607. See also supra note 77.
102. See supra notes 76 & 77 and accompanying text for pertinent legislative history.
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Second, courts in pre-1984 amendment cases viewed the subsection (c)(1),4
03
(c)(2), and (c)(4) defenses as being cumulative. Recall that in In re Rustia0
Judge Swartzberg rejected the subsection (c)(1) and (c)(2) defenses. 05 His
opinion, however, assumes that the subsection (c) defenses in non-secured
transaction cases are cumulative. If it had not been for the existence of
section 547(c)(2)'s 45-day limitation, then that section would have provided
the transferees with a complete defense. Instead, the transferees were allowed
only a partial defense under subsection (c)(4), with protection reduced to
the extent that they had given new value. It seems clear from Rustia that
credit card companies, with the removal of the 45-day limitation, now will
be afforded a complete defense.
Similarly, subsection (c)(4) may not be the exclusive defense for cases in
which new value is given after a preferential payment. First, as explained
above, bankruptcy courts would have to back away from established precedent indicating that these defenses are cumulative. Second, making subsection (c)(4) the exclusive defense would defeat the very policy for that subsection.
Subsection (c)(4) was enacted to provide creditors an incentive to lend to
debtors with the hope that the additional credit will keep them solvent. Thus,
if C, were to receive a $10,000 preferential payment and subsequently extend
the debtor $5,000 in new credit, then subsection (c)(4) would limit the
trustee's recovery to only $5,000. Section 547(c)(2), however, provides a total
defense to the trustee's preference action, leaving the trustee with nothing.
Making subsection (c)(4) the exclusive defense in those cases where new value
is given would discourage creditors like C, from extending new credit. They
would much prefer a total rather than partial defense to the trustee's preference action.
Having rejected suggestions that bankruptcy courts should make subsection
(c)(1) and (c)(4) defenses exclusive, one should now turn to the language of
the subsection to see if it can be reasonably limited in scope. The most
obvious target is subsection 547(c)(2)(B)'s requirement that the "transfer was
made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor
and the transferee." One possible limiting construction is to hold that a

103. The legislative history of § 547(c) states: "Subsection (c) contains exceptions to the
trustee's avoiding power. If a creditor can qualify under any one of the exceptions, then he is
protected to that extent. If he can qualify under several, he is protected by each to the extent
he can qualify under each." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373 (1977). Various
courts have looked to several subsection (c) defenses in analyzing a preference case. See, e.g.,
Tidwell v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. (In re Georgia Steel, Inc.), 38 Bankr. 829 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1984); Keydata Corp. v. Boston Edison Co. (In re Keydata Corp.), 37 Bankr. 324 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1983); Rovzar v. Prime Leather Finishes Co. (In re Saco Local Dev. Corp.), 30 Bankr.
859 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983).
Subsection (c)(3), however, has generally been held to be the exclusive provision for enabling
loan exceptions. If an "enabling loan" transferee is not protected under subsection (c)(3), then
there is no protection under subsection (c)(l). See cases cited supra note 75; see supra text
accompanying notes 73-75.
104. 20 Bankr. 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
105. Rustia, 20 Bankr. at 134-35. See supra text accompanying notes 82-87.
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transferee who receives a payment "knowing" or having "reasonable cause
to believe that the debtor was insolvent" is not receiving the payment in
the ordinary course of its business or financial affairs. One might also be
tempted to argue that payments received after maturity of the note or
installment are not received in the ordinary course of business or financial
affairs of the transferee. Engrafting a "reasonable cause to believe insolvency" test onto the payment has some appeal because it permits the trustee
to recover some of those transfers which were recoverable before 1978. The
creditors in Barash,"1 alleged that it was unfair to require repayment in
situations where they were unaware of the debtor's financial difficulties. In
situations where the trustee can prove that the creditor had reasonable cause
to believe the debtor was insolvent, there would be no defense.
While this argument has superficial appeal, it is unacceptable given the
obvious displeasure Congress has demonstrated with the "reasonable cause
to believe insolvency" test. On two separate occasions the test has been
discarded. 0 7 Since the express language of the test has been discarded, a
court would be hard-pressed to read it back into the code, albeit in a different
section. Additionally, this limitation suggests that the creditor is acting in
bad faith if he is aware of the fact that he is receiving a preference.
Traditionally, however, except in the bankruptcy setting, the giving or taking
of a preference does not constitute bad faith. 108 In view of Congress' obvious
displeasure with the "reasonable cause" test, it should not be used as a
limitation on section 547(c)(2).
The third proposal deals with timely payments. Payments which are
overdue are not made by the debtor and received by the creditor in the
"ordinary course of business or financial affairs." This proposed limitation
has appeal because it is directed to the precise concerns of the credit industry.
Senators Dole and DeConcini, in their exchange on the Senate floor, emphasized that the payments they had in mind were those made at "maturity.' °9 Thus, looking at the statutory language, it is tempting to conclude
that payments not made at maturity, in the case of lump sum obligations,
or in a timely manner, in the case of installment obligations, are not made
and received in the "ordinary course of business or financial affairs" of the
debtor and creditor.
Future creditors likely will counter with the following argument. The
prevailing view before the 1984 amendment was that the "ordinary course"
provision was not applicable to payments made in an untimely manner.
There is nothing in the legislative history to the new amendment to suggest

106. Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981). See also supra text accompanying notes 47-60.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
108. "[lIt is long-settled in commercial law that a debtor may voluntarily prefer one creditor
over another .
I..."
inre Thomas, 7 Bankr. 389, 392 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
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that this same language be construed differently. Therefore, the "ordinary
course" provision need not be satisfied in the case of untimely payments.
The pre-amendment case, In re Ferguson,"0 dealt with certain payments
made by a debtor-pork farmer within 45 days of the date the debts were
incurred. The trustee argued that one payment was "particularly large" as
compared to the debtor's other payments. Therefore, the trustee asserted
that that payment was not made in ordinary course of business. The court
simply assumed, without discussion, that payments made within the 45-day
period were protected."' When one looks at old section 547(c)(2), one can
see how the courts concluded that the time of payment should be governed
solely by the 45-day provision. Recall that draftsman Levin indicated that
45 days was selected as the statutory period because it approximated the
normal trade billing cycle.1 2 Moreover, the scant legislative history does not
suggest that the post-amendment provisions of section 547(c)(2) should be
given any new construction.
13
In addition, creditors will almost certainly point to the Senate Report.'
Recall that Congress was dissatisfied with the fact that creditors expecting
payment on billing cycles in excess of 45 days were not protected from
preference attacks. ' 4 Removing the 45-day limit was designed to increase
protection for trade creditors. If courts were to rule that untimely payments
were not made in ordinary course of business, then cases such as Ferguson
would require further analysis possibly leading to a denial of protection to
trade creditors. For example, if a trade creditor extended credit "payable
in 30 days," then a payment on the 40th day may not be protected.
One can see however that the courts will struggle to find some standard
by which to apply subsection (c)(2). It is obvious from the preceding discussion that "ordinary course" will be an elusive standard to define and,
in all probability, will drive the courts back to the "time" factor. It is clear
from the Dole-DeConcini dialogue' that, although the 45-day provision was
excised from subsection (c)(2), the emphasis remained upon timeliness and

110. 41 Bankr. 118 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984). See also In re Brown, 20 Bankr. 554 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982).
111. The Ferguson court read In re Brown, 20 Bankr. 554 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982), as a
case "where the court applied the 45-day exception rule to certain charges stating that a debtor
may pay for any transaction occurring within the preceding 45-day period without fear of
avoidance by the trustee." 41 Bankr. at 122. Brown cannot be read to support such a bold
statement. See supra note 17.
112. "Forty-five days was selected as a normal trade cycle." Levin, An Introduction to the
Trustee'sAvoiding Policies, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 186 (1979). It is far from clear, however,
that Mr. Levin would approve of the Ferguson court's decision not to look at the "ordinary
course" language or at untimely payments made within the 45-day period. "Congress treated
as nonpreferential an ordinary-coursepayment of trade credit in the first 15 days of the month
following the month in which the goods were shipped or services performed." Id. at 187
(emphasis added).
113. S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1983). For the text of the relevant portion
of the report, see supra notes 64-66.
114. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
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"maturity." Drawing upon this legislative history, the courts may thus
conclude that untimely payments are not made in the ordinary course of
business dealings and are recoverable by the trustee. Ewald Brothers, Inc.
v. Kroft, Inc.,"' 6 is a significant pre-amendment case; unlike other cases
involving late payments made within the 45-day period, Ewald squarely
addressed the question of whether or not the "ordinary course of business"
provision applied to those late payments.
In Ewald, the parties had established a practice of making and accepting
payments one or two days late. The trustee argued, and the court agreed,
that payments which were made seven to twelve days late did not reflect
the ordinary course of dealings between the parties, even though the latter
payments were within the 45-day limit then existing under section 547(c)(2).
The court did not address the 45-day limit apparently because it concluded
that, if the payment was not timely and therefore not in ordinary course,
7
then the 45-day provision was not applicable."1
Congress, when amending section 547(c)(2), obviously had an opportunity
to do more than remove the 45-day provision. It chose not to and left the
remaining language unchanged, including the ordinary course of business
provision. Congress, therefore, excised the 45-day limit to overrule cases
such as Barash, where the primary issue was whether payments were made
within 45 days of the incursion of the debt. The amendment did not disturb
the analysis employed in Ewald, where timeliness, as between the parties,
was crucial in determining whether the payment was made in ordinary course.
On balance, future bankruptcy courts should find Ewald appealing. By
extending the "ordinary course" language to late payments, courts can place
some practical limits on subsection (c)(2)'s scope. The reader should not
assume, however, that all late payments will be held to be unprotected. In
Ewald, the creditor routinely accepted payments that were a day or two late.
While the court left unprotected payments that were seven to twelve days
late, the inference is clear that a payment two days late would have been
in "ordinary course of business" and, therefore, would have been protected.
In determining what constitutes "ordinary course" payments, pre-amendment courts focused solely on dealings between the particular debtor and
creditor," ' rather than examining industry-wide practice or other debtorcreditor relationships. Of course, the very language of the statute directs the

116. 45 Bankr. 52 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). The opinion does not make clear that the
agreement between creditor and debtor required payment in fewer than 45 days after delivery.
This fact, however, has been confirmed. Telephone interview with Mr. Michael Schwartz,
counsel for the trustee, by Professor Price (March 5, 1985). For a discussion of Ewald's analysis
of payment by resubmitting an NSF check, see supra note 80.
117. With the elimination of the 45-day provision, trustees can now make an even stronger
argument: Timeliness is crucial to a determination that the payment was made according to
ordinary business practices.
118. E.g., Amex Trading Co. v. Brown Feed & Chem. Co. (In re Amex Trading Co.), 37
Bankr. 793, 799-801 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1984); Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. Union Elec. Co.
(In re Thomas W. Garland, Inc.), 19 Bankr. 920 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982).
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court to the "business or financial affairs of the debtorand the transferee.""'9
Thus, creditors who routinely and continuously accept payments 60 and 90
20
days late seem to be within the scope of the provision's protection.
CONCLUSION

It is apparent that there is a clear and unavoidable tension between those
who assert that there should be no preferential transfer liability for payment
received in ordinary course of business and those arguing in favor of a
fundamental bankruptcy policy-the equal treatment of creditors. Trade
creditors will never abandon the position that they are "different" creditors
and that they should not be required to return debtor's monthly payment
for supplies, gasoline, or utilities. Unsecured lenders will always maintain
that they should not be required to repay those timely payments debtor
makes every month. They do appear to be willing to concede, however, that
there is possible liability if they are aware that the debtor is financially
troubled at the time debtor makes the payments.
Others have wondered why the utility company and unsecured lenders
should be permitted to keep the preferences while the debtor's other creditors,
such as his relatives and neighbors, cannot. They argue that there is nothing
special about the position of utility companies and trade creditors that
justifies preferential treatment and that Congress, by means of the distri-

119. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(2)(B) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). Recently a
court decided not to embrace the statute's literal language. In Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep.
Clearing House Co.), 41 Bankr. 985 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984), the debtor had been involved in
a so-called "Ponzi" scheme wherein creditors were encouraged to "invest" in an enterprise
which, in reality, was a pyramid with subsequent "investors" paying off the initial "investors."
Before the regulators could shut the debtor down, some of the initial investors were handsomely
repaid. The court ruled that the repayments were not in ordinary course of business:
When these transactions are considered for what they actually were, irrespective
of what the investors' thought they were, these payments could not constitute
transfers in the ordinary course of business of the debtors and made according
to ordinary business terms. All of the transactions were unusual, extraordinary,
and unrelated to any business enterprise whose protection was intended by the
drafters of Section 547(c)(2).
41 Bankr. at 1014-15.
While one may sympathize with the court's concern about the obnoxiousness of the debtor's
enterprise, it is clear that the payments were in ordinary course of business. Certainly there
was nothing unusual about the creditor's receipt of payment, and the debtor's payment was
in complete compliance with what it promised to do. See also Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v.
Union Elec. Co. (In re Thomas W. Garland, Inc.) 19 Bankr. 920 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982)
(refusing to protect payments to a creditor who apparently had proven a "usual course of
business" which was without structure, scheduled payments, or any other procedure consistent
with sound business practice). There is nothing in the statute or legislative history, however,
that suggests that only accepted business practices are to be protected.
120. Perhaps the credit card companies will be the main beneficiary of the elimination of
the 45-day rule. Many of their customers regularly pay only a fraction of their bill. The
companies routinely accept less than full payments so long as a portion of the outstanding
balance is paid.
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bution section of the bankruptcy code,' 2' should decide priorities for the
payment of creditors.
The Bankruptcy Commission embraced the latter point of view and abandoned the "reasonable cause to believe insolvency" test. With the abandonment of this test, however, trade creditors preserved much of their
protected status by persuading Congress to insert section 547(c)(2) into the
1978 code. This offered very little protection to those creditors regularly
lending on an unsecured basis. The most recent amendment apparently was
designed to restore protection to creditors buying commercial paper. '22 In
restoring trade creditors and unsecured lenders to their pre-1978 position,
Congress appears inadvertently to have given far more protection than was
requested or desired by trade creditors.
Certainly Congress did not consider or foresee the fact that subsection
(c)(4) is now of little value and that the policies underlying subsections (c)(1)
and (c)(5) have been substantially undermined. While the courts will use the
"ordinary course of business or financial affairs" language as a limiting
factor, the results are disquieting. Creditors who diligently conduct their
affairs and insist on timely payment of debts will receive no protection when
taking an occasional late payment. Creditors who are less diligent and who
routinely take payments many days late have a powerful argument that such
payments are protected. Thus, the policy of uniform treatment of creditors,
a policy that the preference section was promulgated to promote, will be
substantially subverted.
It is possible that after its struggle to resolve conflicting philosophies
concerning bankruptcy court jurisdiction,' 23 Congress was simply weary of
looking at the bankruptcy code. Congress should, however, take another
look at what it has done with section 547(c)(2). The problem could be easily
solved by making one defense available for creditors who receive payments
during a normal billing cycle and a separate defense available for creditors
who receive timely payments on an installment note or who receive payments

121. 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
122. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.

123. See Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). In
dismissing a suit for alleged breach of contract and warranty, the Marathon Court held that

§ 1471(b) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 unconstitutionally conferred Article III powers on
bankruptcy judges. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 87. The Supreme Court originally stayed the judgment
in Marathon until October 4, 1982, to give Congress time to respond to the decision. 458 U.S.
at 88. Subsequently, an extension of the stay to December 24, 1982 was granted. Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 813 (1982). A second extension of
the stay was requested by Congress, but denied by the Court. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 1094 (1982). Congress, in turn, extended the original
transition period of the 1978 Act to June 27, 1984 so that the status of bankruptcy courts
would remain unchanged beyond April 1, 1984, the date the new Act's provisions were to have
taken effect. See Snider, Rochkind, Green, Stein & Welford, The Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 63 MICH. B.J. 775 (1984). A legislative stalemate over the
status of bankruptcy judges continued until the final approval of the 1984 Act. A conference
committee finally ironed out the differences on June 27th and 28th. The bill was approved by
both houses of Congress on June 29th and was signed into law on July 10, 1984. Id. at 775.

19851

BANKRUPTCY SECTION 547(c)(2)

513

at maturity in the case of a lump sum obligation. Until Congress promulgates
further amendments to the Code, some bankruptcy courts will reluctantly
rule that section 547(c)(2) provides a defense for overdue preferential payments to creditors who were fully aware of the precarious financial condition
of the debtor.

